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NOTES 
PROSECUTING NAZI WAR CRIMINALS IN THE 
UNITED STATES: THE TIME IN WHICH TO 
PUNISH THEM IS RUNNING OUT 
If we believe, as we must believe, that no one anywhere shall 
be allowed to perpetrate another Holocaust, we cannot content 
ourselves with promises that we will take stern action the next 
time, whilst we turn our backs on the criminals who are demon-
strably guilty. 
Allan A. Ryan, Jr., 
Director of the Justice Department's 
Office of Special Investigations, 1980-83.1 
I. INTRODUCTION 
The time in which to punish Nazi war criminals is running 
out. This urgency emerges out of the growth of worldwide neo-Nazi 
movements,2 out of the recent deaths of Nazi war criminals, Rudolf 
Hess3 and Josef Mengele;' and out of the public interest to punish 
these criminals for committing crimes against humanity.5 The need 
to punish Nazi war criminals can be compared to the need to pun-
ish terrorists. For example, in response to a rise in terrorism, the 
United States recently enacted legislation conferring jurisdiction 
upon its courts to prosecute terrorists committing acts of terrorism 
abroad that injure U.S. citizens. 6 There is a similar need for the 
1. A. RYAN, QUIET NEIGHBORS 337 (1984). 
2. See N.Y. Times, Sept. 17, 1987, at 12, col. 1. During a radio interview, Jean-Marie 
LePen, leader of the French right wing political group, the National Front, and presidential 
candidate, described Nazi gas chambers as a "minor point" in the history of World War II. 
This statement caused an uproar amongst French socialists, communists, and other political 
groups who fear a neo-Nazi revival in France with the growth of support for LePen. See id. 
3. See N.Y. Times, Aug. 18, 1987, at l, col. 1. Rudolph Hess was tried and convicted by 
the International Military Tribunal at Nuremberg in 1946. He was sentenced to life impris-
onment at Spandau in West Berlin. After four decades at the prison, Hess died on August 
17, 1987 at age 93, where rumor circulated that he probably committed suicide. Id. 
4. See G. POSNER & J . WARE, MENGELE, THE COMPLETE STORY (1986); see infra note 12. 
5. A. RYAN, KLAUS BARBIE AND THE UNITED STATES GOVERNMENT: A REPORT TO THE AT-
TORNEY GENERAL OF THE UNITED STATES 169-70 (Aug. 1983). See also A. RYAN, supra note 1, 
at 324-44 (Ryan's discussion of a reawakened public interest in the Holocaust). 
6. Omnibus Diplomatic Security and Anti-terrorism Act of 1986, Pub. L. No. 99-399, 
§1202, codified as amended at 18 U.S.C. §2331, reprinted in 1986 U.S. CODE CONG. & ADMIN. 
NEWS (100 Stat.) 853. 
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United States to assert jurisdiction over the prosecution of Nazi 
war criminals who, in essence, committed terrorist acts against 
subsequently nationalized U.S. citizens. 
Traditionally, the U.S. government has based assertions of ju-
risdiction on nationality or territoriality principles. 7 If the criminal 
was not a U.S. citizen at the time of the crime, the U.S. govern-
ment generally has refused to exercise jurisdiction under the na-
tionality principle. 8 Moreover, if the crime was committed outside 
U.S. territory, the U.S. government generally has refused to exer-
cise jurisdiction under the territoriality principle.9 Accordingly, the 
United States never has conferred jurisdiction upon its federal 
courts to prosecute Nazi war criminals.10 Instead, the United 
States has chosen to waive all claims of jurisdiction in favor of na-
tions recognizing jurisdiction to prosecute and punish the alleged 
criminal.11 Waiving jurisdiction, in effect, allows Nazi war 
criminals to go free, especially if no other nation chooses to prose-
cute.12 The purpose of this Note is to demonstrate that the United 
States can and must assert jurisdiction over Nazi war criminals in 
order to punish them properly. 
In Part II, this Note describes the five principles of jurisdic-
tion: nationality, territoriality, the protective principle, passive 
personality and universality, and also explains why the United 
States traditionally has not recognized the last principle, which 
would confer jurisdiction over Nazi war criminals. 
In Part Ill, this Note compares U.S. jurisdiction as it is today 
with that of Germany and Israel, the former claiming national and 
territorial jurisdiction and the latter claiming universal jurisdiction 
over Nazi war criminals. This Note also compares U.S. jurisdiction 
7. See infra notes 41-73 and accompanying text. 
8. See infra note 42. 
9. See RESTATEMENT (REVISED) OF FOREIGN RELATIONS LAWS OF THE UNITED STATES 
§402(1)(a) note 1 (Tent. Draft No. 6, 1985); see also RESTATEMENT (REVISED) OF FOREIGN 
RELATIONS LAWS OF THE UNITED STATES §403. [hereinafter REVISED RESTATEMENT]. The 
United States follows the territoriality principle. Id. at §402(1). 
10. The United States "[h]as been reluctant to ... recognize the possibility that its 
courts may exercise jurisdiction over international crimes." M. BASSIOUNI, INTERNATIONAL 
EXTRADITION: UNITED STATES LAW AND PRACTICE ch. 7, §7.4 (1983). 
11. See infra notes 157-177 and accompanying text. The United States gladly accepts 
extradition requests for alleged Nazi war criminals from countries willing to exert jurisdic-
tion over the criminals. See id. 
12. See supra note 4. For example, the war crimes committed by Nazi doctor Josef 
Mengele, known as the "Angel of Death," went unpunished. Not until 1984 did the interna-
tional community actively pursue Mengele's apprehension. The manhunt came too late to 
serve justice. Mengele died sometime in 1985, before being caught and sentenced for the 
atrocities he committed at Auschwitz. Id. 
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with that of Canada, a country facing similar circumstances re-
garding the prosecution of Nazi war criminals. 
In Part IV, this Note discusses the trend in the United States 
to exercise jurisdiction over terrorists, although the terrorists are 
foreign nationals and have not physically committed any crimes 
within U.S. territory. This Note analogizes Nazi war crimes to ter-
rorism, especially as pertaining to the universality and passive per-
sonality principles. It explains why it is proper for the United 
States to exercise jurisdiction over Nazi war criminals through an 
extension of the universality doctrine. 
Finally, in Part V, this Note calls for the United States to pass 
legislation or to amend its current immigration and criminal laws 
restricting the bases of jurisdiction in order to allow the U.S. 
courts to prosecute and sentence Nazi war criminals. This proposal 
is patterned after the recent extension of jurisdiction over ter-
rorists, and would greatly assist the worldwide effort to punish 
Nazi war criminals.13 
II. INTERNATIONAL PRINCIPLES OF CRIMINAL JURISDICTION 
A. Overview 
There are five principles of criminal jurisdiction in interna-
tional law.1" These principles are territoriality, nationality, the pro-
tective principle, passive personality and universality.16 Each prin-
ciple can be exercised in order to prosecute Nazi war criminals.16 
13. An example of a worldwide effort to punish Nazi war criminals is the belated man-
hunt of Josef Mengele. The search was led by the United States Department of Justice 
(Army Task Force to Hunt Mengele, N.Y. Times, Feb. 21, 1985, at 5, col. 5), with the help 
of West Germany, Israel (Three Nations Joining to Hunt Mengele, N.Y. Times, May 11, 
1985, at 1, col. 1), and Paraguay (Paraguay is Said to Promise Manhunt for a Nazi Fugi-
tive, N.Y. Times, Nov. 24, 1984, at 7, col. 2). 
14. Jurisdiction with Respect to Crime, Draft Convention on Jurisdiction with Re-
spect to Crime, 29 A.J.l.L. 435, 445 (1935) [hereinafter Draft Convention]; see also REVISED 
RESTATEMENT, supra note 9, at §401. Criminal jurisdiction in international law includes ju-
risdiction to enforce, prescribe and adjudicate. Id. 
15. Draft Convention, supra note 14, at 445. 
16. A war criminal is someone who has committed war crimes and/or crimes against 
humanity as defined by international law: 
(b) WAR CRIMES: namely, violations of the laws or customs of war. Such viola-
tions shall include, but not be limited to, murder, ill-treatment or deportation to 
slave labor or for any other purpose of civilian population of or in occupied terri-
tory, murder or ill-treatment of prisoners of war or persons on the seas, killing of 
hostages, plunder of public or private property, wanton destruction of cities, towns 
or villages, or devastation not justified by military necessity; 
(c) CRIMES AGAINST HUMANITY: namely, murder, extermination, enslave-
ment, deportation, and other inhumane acts committed against any civilian popula-
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The territoriality principle recognizes that states are compe-
tent to punish crimes committed within their territory.17 Underly-
ing territorial jurisdiction is the notion that every state retains 
physical power as a necessary and sufficient condition for the exer-
cise of jurisdiction over a defendant or his property.18 For example, 
a state has physical power over a defendant by virtue of his actions 
committed within that state or by virtue of his property located 
within that state, thereby justifying an exercise of territorial juris-
diction. 19 This principle is the most fundamental and is regarded 
to be of primary worldwide importance.20 
By virtue of the second, the nationality principle, a state can 
prosecute its national, 21 the alleged Nazi war criminal, regardless 
of where the crime was committed.22 For example, Germany could 
assert jurisdiction over any of its nationals accused of Nazi war 
crimes, because the majority of Nazi war criminals were German 
nationals. 23 Underlying the nationality principle is the assumption 
tion, before or during the war, or persecutions on political, racial or religious 
grounds in execution of or in connection with any crime within the jurisdiction of 
the Tribunal, whether or not in violation of the domestic law of the country where 
perpetrated. 
Agreement for the Prosecution and Punishment of the Major War Criminals of the Euro-
pean Axis, Aug. 8, 1945, 59 Stat. 1544, E.A.S. No. 472, 82 U.N.T.S. 279; Charter of the 
International Military Tribunal, art. 6, 59 Stat. 1544, 1547, E.A.S. No. 472, at 4, 82 U.N.T.S. 
284. 
17. Draft Convention, supra note 14, at 480. 
A State has jurisdiction with respect to any crime committed in whole or in part 
within its territory 
This jurisdiction extends to 
(a) Any participation outside its territory in a crime committed . . . in whole or 
in part within its territory; and 
(b)Any attempt outside its territory to commit a crime in whole ... or in part 
within its territory. Id. 
18. W. RICHMAN & w. REYNOLDS, UNDERSTANDING CONFLICT OF LAWS 93 (1984). Physical 
power is no longer a prerequisite for the exercise of jurisdiction in the United States. See 
International Shoe Co. v. Washington, 326 U.S. 310 (1945). 
19. See, e.g., International Shoe, 326 U.S. at 310. 
20. The territoriality principle finds expression in many national codes. For a complete 
listing, see Draft Convention, supra note 14, at 481-82. 
21. Draft Convention, supra note 14, at 473. According to the Draft Convention, "[a] 
'national' of a State is a natural person upon whom that State has conferred its nationality 
... in conformity with international law." 
22. Id. at 519. A State has jurisdiction with respect to any crime committed outside its 
territory: 
(a) By a natural person who was a national of that State when the crime was com-
mitted or who is a national of that State when prosecuted or punished; or 
(b) By a corporation or other juristic person which had the national character of 
that State when the crime was committed. Id. 
23. Infra note 77 and accompanying text. 
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that a state has almost unlimited legal control over its nationals, 
which is why this principle is so widely accepted. 24 
Under the third, the protective principle, a state has jurisdic-
tion with respect to a crime committed against the security, integ-
rity or independence of its government, although committed extra-
territorially.25 For example, the United States recently asserted 
jurisdiction over a foreign national on the ground that drug traf-
ficking constituted a threat to U.S. security.26 The protective prin-
ciple is recognized in the United States27 and also in international 
law. 28 This principle, however, is often subject to abuse by states 
which stretch the concept of what constitutes a threat to their se-
curity in order to establish jurisdiction29 and, therefore, it is 
ranked as a basis for secondary, or auxiliary jurisdiction. 30 
The fourth, the passive personality principle, permits states 
whose nationals are victims of crimes, to assume jurisdiction re-
gardless of where the crime occurred. 31 Although it has been used 
to exercise jurisdiction over extraterritorial crimes, 32 the passive 
personality principle has been more strongly contested than any 
other type of auxiliary competence. 38 Accordingly, it has been re-
jected by the United States and other countries as the sole basis 
for establishing jurisdiction. 84 
24. The nationality principle finds expression in many national codes. For a complete 
listing, see Draft Convention, supra note 14, at 523-25. 
25. See Draft Convention, supra note 14, at 543. 
A State has jurisdiction with respect to any crime committed outside its territory by 
an alien against the security, territorial integrity or political independence of that 
State, provided that the act or omission which constitutes the crime was not com-
mitted in exercise of a liberty guaranteed the alien by the law of the place where it 
was committed. Id. 
26. See United States v. Newball, 524 F. Supp. 715 (E.D.N.Y. 1981). 
27. See REVISED RESTATEMENT, supra note 9, at §402(3). 
28. Contra The Geneva Convention on the High Seas, opened for signature April 29, 
1985, art. 11, para. 1, 13 U.S.T. 2312, 2316 T.l.A.S. No. 5200, 450 U.N.T.S. 82, 88. 
29. Moeller, U.S. Treatment of Alleged Nazi War Criminals: International Law, Im-
migration Law and the Need for International Cooperation, 25 VA. J. INT'L L., 793, 852 
(1985). 
30. Draft Convention, supra note 14, at 445. Secondary, or auxiliary competence is de-
fined as any type of jurisdiction other than national or territorial, which constitutes primary 
competence. See id. 
31. Id. 
32. See, e.g., S.S. Lotus (France v. Turk.), 1927 P.C.I.J., (ser. A) No. 9 (Judgment of 
Sept. 7). 
33. See Draft Convention, supra note 14, at 579 (especially by the United States and 
Great Britain). 
34. Id.; See B MEHRISH, WAR CRIMES AND GENOCIDE: THE TRIALS OF PAKASTANI WAR 
CRIMINALS 16-19 (1972). It should be noted that the universality principle served as the 
basis of jurisdiction over Nazi war criminals at the Nuremberg Trials. The Nuremberg Tri-
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The final principle of jurisdiction in international law, and 
perhaps the most important one with respect to the prosecution of 
war criminals, is the universality principle,35 which determines ju-
risdiction by reference to the custody of the criminal. 36 Therein the 
sole basis of such jurisdiction is the presence of the criminal within 
the state assuming jurisdiction, regardless of the perpetrator's or 
victim's nationality. 37 Under this principle, the punishment of Nazi 
war crimes could be undertaken by any one state on behalf of all 
other states. Under the universality principle, however, jurisdiction 
may be invoked only after the state with custody has surrendered 
the alien for prosecution to other states ·and that off er has gone 
unaccepted.38 The universality principle is widely,39 but by no 
means universally, accepted as a basis of auxiliary competence.40 
B. Principles Recognized by the United States 
The United States actively recognizes the jurisdictional princi-
ples of territoriality,41 nationality,42 and the protective principle.43 
Traditionally, the United States recognized only the territorial 
principle of jurisdiction as set forth by the Supreme Court in 1909. 
In American Banana Co. v. United Fruit Co.,44 Justice 
Holmes stated the general rule that the character of an act as un-
lawful must be determined by the law of the country where it is 
committed.45 Accordingly, the perpetrator must be tried by the 
state in which he committed the crime to avoid interference with 
bunal, composed of members of the Allied Powers, had a right under the Charter of the 
International Military Tribunal to prosecute Nazi war criminals. The Nuremberg Tribunal 
was, therefore, justified in assuming that Nazi war crimes were crimes under international 
law, and as an international court, the Tribunal had the legal right to apply international 
law to try and sentence the accused. 
35. Draft Convention, supra note 14, at 573. 
36. Id. 
37. Id. 
38. See Draft Convention, supra note 14, at 582. 
39. The universality principle finds expression in many national codes. For a complete 
listing, see Draft Convention, supra note 14, at 574-76. 
40. Id. at 445. See also, Draft Convention, supra note 30 (for an explanation of "auxil-
iary competence"). 
41. The United States recognizes the territoriality principle of jurisdiction. See REVISED 
RESTATEMENT, supra note 9, at §402(1)(a). 
42. See REVISED RESTATEMENT, supra note 9, at §402(2). 
43. The United States asserted the protective principle of jurisdiction in the case of 
U.S. v. Newball, 524 F. Supp. 715 (E.D.N.Y. 1981) (implying that drug trafficking is a threat 
to U.S. security). 
44. American Banana Co. v. United Fruit Co., 213 U.S. 347 (1909). 
45. Id. at 347. 
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the authority of another sovereign."6 This rule remained the fore-
most principle of jurisdiction in the United States for over thirty 
years."7 
Over the last several decades, however, U.S. courts progres-
sively have moved away from the narrow Holmesian principle of 
territorial jurisdiction. "8 This trend suggests a more aggressive ap-
proach toward establishing jurisdiction and is evident in the cases 
decided since American Banana,"9 which rendered American Ba-
nana virtually obsolete.6° For example, in United States v. Alumi-
num Co. of America (ALCOA),61 Judge Learned Hand stated that 
any state may hold a person liable for extraterritorial conduct hav-
ing effects within its borders. 62 
Similar to the movement away from purely territorial notions 
of jurisdiction, the movement away from quasi-in-rem proceedings, 
as a method of establishing jurisdiction over a defendant, has been 
replaced by a more practical emphasis on fairness. 63 No longer will 
a court assert jurisdiction over a person solely because he happens 
to own property within that state. Instead, a court will look to the 
defendant's contacts with the state before approving an exercise of 
jurisdiction. H 
Originally, in Pennoyer v. Neff,66 Justice Field stated that the 
Oregon court lacked personal jurisdiction over the defendant, be-
cause he was neither domiciled in Oregon nor served with process 
there.66 The Supreme Court, however, held that the Oregon court 
could attach land owned by the defendant and located in Oregon, 
in order to enforce a personal judgment against him on an unre-
lated claim.67 The Supreme Court's use of quasi-in-rem jurisdic-
tion, however, was later found to be unfair in light of due process 
46. Id. at 355. 
47. United States v. Aluminum Co. of America (ALCOA), 148 F.2d 416 (2d Cir. 1945). 
The current trend is toward expanding principles of jurisdiction. 
48. L.F.E. Goldie, A Taxonomy of Claims to Exercise Jurisdiction - Nationality, Terri-
toriality, Protection of the State and its Processes, and Universality 1 (unpublished manu-
script available at Syracuse University College of Law). 
49. Id. at 19. 
50. Id. at 13. 
51. ALCOA, 148 F.2d at 416. 
52. Id. at 443. 
53. See Pennoyer v. Neff, 95 U.S. 714 (1877). 
54. See International Shoe Co. v. Washington, 326 U.S. 310 (1945). 
55. Pennoyer v. Neff, 95 U.S. at 714. 
56. Id. 
57. Id. at 723. The Supreme Court found that the exercise of quasi-in-rem jurisdiction 
in no way infringed upon the sovereignty of the state in which Neff was domiciled. Id. 
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as set forth in International Shoe Co. v. Washington. 
In International Shoe,68 the Supreme Court held: 
[d]ue process requires ... that in order to subject a defendant to a 
judgment in personam, if he not be present within the territory of 
the forum, he [must] have certain minimum contacts within it such 
that the maintenance of the suit does not offend 'traditional no-
tions of fair play and substantial justice'.~9 
Not only did International Shoe expand the scope of jurisdiction, 
it changed the traditional concept of jurisdiction, as found in Pen-
noyer, from a narrow emphasis on territoriality to a more practical 
emphasis on fairness. 60 
The trend of U.S. courts toward a more aggressive approach of 
extraterritorial jurisdiction, however, mainly has been exercised to 
prosecute antitrust cases concerning foreign commerce,61 conspir-
acy cases, 62 and cases where fraud has been perpetrated abroad. 63 
U.S. courts also take an aggressive role against actions concerning 
international terrorism committed against U.S. citizens.64 All the 
above-mentioned crimes have occurred outside U.S. borders, but 
they have had a severe "effect" within,66 which is why the United 
States has recognized jurisdiction to prosecute the perpetrators. 66 
As for other methods, the United States traditionally has not 
recognized the principle of passive personality as the sole basis of 
58. International Shoe, 326 U.S. at 310. 
59. Id. at 316. The Supreme Court could have upheld jurisdiction, because the defend-
ant was doing business in Washington. Instead, the Supreme Court destroyed the need to 
ground jurisdiction on territorial power absent the requisite minimum contacts. Id. 
60. w. RICHMAN & W. REYNOLDS, supra note 18, at 85. 
61. See American Banana Co. v. United Fruit Co., 213 U.S. 347 (1909); Strassheim v. 
Daily, 221 U.S. 280 (1911); see Holophane Co. Inc. v. United States, 352 U.S. 903 (1956); see 
United States v. American Tobacco Co., 221 U.S. 106 (1911). 
62. See generally Goldie, supra note 48. 
63. See id. 
64. See infra notes 151-164 and accompanying text. 
65. The "effect" within U.S. borders has been on U.S. citizens (for example, on family 
and friends of the U.S. victims injured abroad) and on U.S. policy (for example, the pres-
sure of lobbyists in Congress calling for the United States to take action against extraterri-
torial crimes committed against U.S. citizens). 
66. An example of the use of the "effects doctrine" is the Cutting Case, reprinted in 
1887 Papers Relating To The Foreign Relations Of The United States 751 (1888). In Cut-
ting, a Mexican court convicted an American journalist of libeling a Mexican citizen in a 
newspaper article printed in Texas. The Mexican court asserted jurisdiction under a Mexi-
can long-arm statute which provided that "[p]enal offenses committed in a foreign country 
by ... a foreigner against Mexicans, may be punished in the Republic." Id. at 856. Cutting 
was convicted by the Mexican court, because of the effect his libelous statement had on the 
plaintiff within Mexico. However, Cutting was later released under an order of the Mexican 
appellate court after the victim withdrew his complaint. Id. 
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jurisdiction,67 and generally considers the principle to be an anath-
ema to U.S. federal law.68 The American repudiation of the passive 
personality principle is based upon the Restatement (Second) of 
Foreign Relations Law which provides that, "A State does not have 
the jurisdiction to prescribe a rule of law attaching legal conse-
quences to conduct of an alien outside its territory merely on the 
ground that the conduct affects one of its nationals. "69 Accord-
ingly, the United States generally has refused to assert jurisdiction 
over extraterritorial crimes where the victim happened to be a U.S. 
national.70 Similarly, the U.S. government continues to protest as-
sertions of jurisdiction by foreign courts over acts of U.S. nationals 
committed abroad. 71 
The United States has been equally reluctant to assert juris-
diction under the universality principle. 72 Instead of prosecuting 
and sentencing criminals residing in the United States who have 
committed extraterritorial crimes, the United States has regularly 
chosen to denaturalize, deport or extradite them to the country in 
which they committed the crime. 78 
C. Conferring Jurisdiction Over Nazi War Criminals in the 
United States 
Compliance with territoriality or nationality principles is not 
feasible in the case of Nazi war criminals, because Nazi war crimes 
were not committed within U.S. territory or by U.S. nationals. Nor 
is there an argument for the use of the protective principle, be-
cause Nazi war crimes were not committed against the security, 
territorial integrity or political independence of the United States. 
Furthermore, the passive personality principle is inapplicable, be-
cause the victims were not U.S. citizens at the time of the crimes. 
The most persuasive argument in favor of U.S. jurisdiction is 
under the universality principle, whereby the United States would 
have jurisdiction solely based on the presence of the alien within 
67. See, e.g., United States v. Columba-Colella, 604 F.2d 356 (5th Cir. 1979). 
68. See Blakesley, A Conceptual Framework for Extradition and Jurisdiction Over 
Extraterritorial Crimes, 1984 UTAH L. REV. 685, 715. 
69. RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF FOREIGN RELATIONS LAW OF THE UNITED STATES §30(2) 
comment e (1965). 
70. See Blakesley, supra note 68, at 715. 
71. See id. See also Cutting Case, reprinted in 1887 Papers Relating To The Foreign 
Relations of the United States 751, 856 (1888). 
72. See infra notes 150-156 and accompanying text. 
73. See infra notes 157-177 and accompanying text. 
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its territory at the time it decided to prosecute. 74 
III. COMPARISON OF JURISDICTION: GERMANY, ISRAEL AND CANADA 
WITH THE UNITED STATES 
The United States has yet to recognize the principle of univer-
sality which would confer jurisdiction over Nazi war criminals. 7~ 
Germany, Israel and Canada, on the other hand, have recognized 
jurisdiction over Nazi war criminals and have taken relatively ac-
tive roles in prosecuting them. 
A. Germany76 
Germany has territorial and national jurisdiction over Nazi 
war criminals, because many of the war crimes were committed on 
German soil and by German nationals. Therefore, Germany is per-
ceived as having primary responsibility77 to prosecute and punish 
Nazi war criminals. With the flood of emigration from Germany 
following World War 11,78 however, Germany would have to re-
quest the extradition of Nazi war criminals from the countries 
where the criminals have relocated. For the most part, the Federal 
Republic of Germany has failed to make many requests for the ex-
tradition of Nazi war criminals.79 
Germany is reluctant to seek the extradition of Nazi war 
criminals because many of the alleged criminals were non-German 
citizens at the time they committed their crimes. 8° Furthermore, 
Germany claims that these non-Germans committed crimes 
outside the territory of Nazi Germany during World War II, al-
though acting under the authority of the Nazi government.81 The 
Federal Republic, therefore, claims that it lacks the required juris-
diction to prosecute many Nazi war criminals.82 Despite its reluc-
tance, the Federal Republic of Germany has attempted to prose-
cute Nazi war criminals who committed war crimes on German 
74. Draft Convention, supra note 14, at 573. 
75. See supra notes 41-73 and accompanying text. 
76. The terms "Federal Republic of Germany," "West Germany" and "Germany" are 
used interchangeably herein. 
77. See supra note 30. Nations possessing national and territorial jurisdiction over the 
alleged criminals are viewed as having primary responsibility to prosecute. 
78. See infra notes 150-153 and accompanying text. 
79. See Moeller, supra note 29, at 810. Only one individual has ever been extradited 
from the United States to West Germany. See infra note 86 and accompanying text. 
80. See A. RYAN, supra note 1, at 8-14, 192-93, and 353-61. 
81. See Moeller, supra note 29, at 811. 
82. See id. 
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soil. 83 
One attempt by Germany to punish Nazi war criminals oc-
curred in 1973, when the Federal Republic requested the extradi-
tion of Hermine Braunsteiner Ryan from the United States pursu-
ant to a 1930 treaty of extradition. 84 Ryan, a naturalized American 
citizen at the time of the request,86 was being charged by Germany 
with murder committed while a guard at Maidanek, a concentra-
tion camp near the city of Lublin in Poland. 86 Ryan, a native Aus-
trian, was not a German citizen when she committed her crimes.87 
Nonetheless, the Federal Republic asserted criminal jurisdiction 
over her and convicted her of committing war crimes during the 
Nazi regime. 88 
Following Ryan, forty-eight cases were pending in German 
courts against Nazi war criminals during the mid-1970s.89 It was 
reported that German prosecutors were no longer interested in this 
work.90 They felt that the Nazi crimes committed during World 
War II were a thing of the past.91 Accordingly, approximately 3,000 
Nazi war criminals who had not yet been brought to trial would 
escape prosecution in Germany when the statute of limitations on 
Nazi crimes expired in 1979.92 
Germany's waning commitment to prosecute Nazi war 
criminals is exemplified by Klaus Barbie. In 1945, the year after 
83. See, e.g., Convention on Extradition, infra note 136 and accompanying text. Soil or 
territory, in extradition treaties, are defined as the territory, including the waters and air-
space belonging to or under the control of one of the contracting parties (emphasis added). 
84. Treaty of Extradition, July 12, 1930, United States-Germany, 47 U.S.T. 1862, 
T.l.A.S. No. 836. 
85. New York Times reporter Joseph Lelyveld pursued a trail of information he re-
ceived to find the truth about Ryan, a naturalized American citizen residing in New York. 
See Lelyveld, Former Nazi Camp Guard is Now a Housewife in Queens, N.Y. Times, July 
14, 1964, at 10, col. 3. 
86. See In re extradition of Hermine Ryan, 360 F. Supp. 270 (E.D.N.Y. 1973), aff'd 478 
F.2d 1397 (2d Cir. 1973). 
87. See generally J. GEHL, AUSTRIA, GERMANY AND THE ANSCHLUSS 1931-1938 (1963). 
Although Ryan, a native-born Austrian, was considered a German during the Anschluss, it 
was not until 1939, the year after the end of the Anschluss, that Ryan joined the Nazi party. 
See A. RYAN, supra note 1, at 47. 
88. See Sulzberger, Proposals to Speed War Crimes Studied, N.Y. Times, Nov. 15, 
1981, at 27, col. 1. 
89. A. RYAN, supra note 1, at 332. 
90. See id. 
91. N.Y. Times, Aug. 29, 1975, at 1, col. 2. Craig Whitney reported that, "increasingly, 
West Germany has turned away from the past as something long ago paid for and long since 
overcome." Id. 
92. See A. RYAN, supra note 1, at 332. Not until 1979 did worldwide protest persuade 
West Germany to indefinitely extend its statute of limitations on Nazi crimes. Id. at 333. 
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the Allied armies forced the Nazi troops out of France, Barbie, an 
SS first lieutenant, fled to La Paz, Bolivia to escape prosecution for 
the crimes he committed in Lyon. 93 France filed a formal extradi-
tion request with the Bolivian government, charging Barbie with 
war crimes.94 In 1974, the Supreme Court of Bolivia rejected 
France's request, because Bolivia had no formal extradition treaty 
with France.96 Barbie, by then a Bolivian citizen, could not be ex-
tradited to France. 96 
In 1982, the West German government was pressured to re-
quest Barbie's extradition from Bolivia.97 Bolivia rejected the re-
quest for the same reason it had almost a decade earlier with 
France: the absence of an extradition treaty between Bolivia and 
West Germany.98 On January 25, 1983, however, Barbie was ar-
rested by the Bolivian government, expelled from that country, 
and sent directly to West Germany.99 The Germans protested tak-
ing in Barbie under such short notice. 100 Although the West 
Germans filed the extradition request, they never expected to get 
Barbie, nor did they want him.101 
Germany refused to cooperate with any attempts to expel 
Barbie from Bolivia.102 Germany, the country with primary respon-
sibility to punish Barbie, failed to assert national jurisdiction. Ac-
cordingly, Barbie's crimes remained unpunished until recently, 
when France was finally able to obtain him.103 
93. See id. at 275. 
94. Id. 
95. See id. at 277. 
96. Id. 
97. Id. West Germany was chosen by the international community to request Barbie's 
extradition, because Germany had primary competence - national jurisdiction - to prosecute. 
See id. 
98. See id. 
99. See id. at 278. Bolivia finally agreed to extradite Barbie to Germany. 
100. See id. 
101. See id. 
102. See N.Y. York Times, Mar. 3, 1983, at A26, col. 1. 
103. Bolivia took the chance of violating legal norms and made a new attempt at extra-
dition with France. The gamble worked and the French government brought Barbie to stand 
trial in Lyon. Barbie was charged with ". . . eight counts of crimes against humanity; the 
liquidation of the Union Generals of Jews in France; the deportation of 650 French men, 
women and children on the last convoy to Auschwitz; the arrest and torture and execution 
of scores of Lyon's Jews; the deportation of fifty-two orphaned children from Isieux." See A. 
RYAN, supra note 1, at 279. If France had not fervently pursued the extradition, Barbie's 
war crimes probably would have gone unpunished. 
12
Syracuse Journal of International Law and Commerce, Vol. 15, No. 2 [1989], Art. 7
https://surface.syr.edu/jilc/vol15/iss2/7
1989] Nazi War Criminals 269 
B. Israel 
Unlike Germany, Israel recognizes international criminal juris-
diction under the passive personality104 and universality106 princi-
ples. Israel, however, actively exercises the latter in order to prose-
cute Nazi war criminals. 106 
In 1950, the Israeli Knesset enacted the Nazi and Nazi Collab-
orators (Punishment) Law.107 Under the Nazi Punishment Law, an 
Israeli court can impose the death penalty108 upon any person it 
convicts of committing crimes against the Jewish people,109 for war 
crimes110 and for crimes against humanity. m 
An example of the use of the Nazi Punishment Law was 
Adolph Eichmann's criminal trial in Israel.112 The Israeli Mossad 
fervently hunted down Eichmann, kidnapped him in Argentina 
and brought him to Israel to stand trial on fifteen counts of crimi-
nal acts under the Nazi Punishment Law.113 Thirteen months after 
104. In 1972, Israel amended its criminal laws to provide: 
2B. (a) The courts of Israel shall be competent to try in Israel under Israeli law a 
person who has committed abroad an act which would be an offense if it had been 
committed in Israel and which harmed or was intended to harm the life, person, 
health, freedom or property of a national or resident of Israel. 
Penal Law Amendment (Amend. No. 4) Law, 5732 - 1972, Laws of the State of Israel no. 26 
(1971-1972). 
105. See Goldie, supra note 48, at 17-18. 
106. See id. at 18. 
107. See Moeller, supra note 29, at 855 n.392 (citing Law of Aug. 1, 5710-1950 [1950] 4 
Laws of the State of Israel No. 64, at 154). 
108. See Moeller, supra note 29, at 855 n.393 (citing Law of August 1, 5710-1950 [1950] 
4 Laws of the State of Israel No. 64, at 154, § l(a)(l)-(3)). The Nazi Punishment Law states: 
A person who has committed one of the following offences-
1) did, during the period of the Nazi regime, in a hostile country, an act constitut-
ing a crime against the Jewish people; 
2) did, during the period of the Nazi regime, in a hostile country, an act constitut-
ing a crime against humanity; 
3) did, during the period of the second World War, in a hostile country, an act 
constituting a war crime; 
is liable to the death penalty. Id. at §l(a)(l)-(3). 
109. The definition of "crimes against the Jewish people" is similar to the definition of 
"genocide" defined in the Genocide Convention. See Convention on the Prevention and 
Punishment of the Crime of Genocide, art II(a)-(e), opened for signature Dec. 9, 1948, 78 
U.N.T.S. 277 [hereinafter Genocide Convention]. 
110. The definition of "war crimes" is the same as that in the Charter of the Interna-
tional Military Tribunal, supra note 16. 
111. The definition of "crimes against humanity" is the same as that in the Charter of 
the International Military Tribunal, supra note 16. 
112. Moeller, supra note 29, at 855 n.396 (citing Attorney General of the Government 
of Israel v. Adolph Eichmann, 36 I.L.R. 18 (Dist. Ct. Jerusalem 1961), aff'd, 36 I.L.R. 277 
(Sup. Ct. Isr. 1962)). 
113. Moeller, supra note 29, at 855 n.397 and accompanying text (citing 36 I.L.R. at 
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the trial began, Eichmann was convicted and sentenced to death.114 
The District Court of Jerusalem relied upon the univerality, 
passive personality, and protecive principles to affirm Israel's exer-
cise of extraterritorial jurisdiction in the Eichmann case.116 Al-
though the Supreme Court of Israel agreed with the District 
Court's rationale, 116 the former based the claim of jurisdiction 
solely upon the univerality principle.117 
The Eichmann trial raised important legal issues;118 for exam-
ple, Eichmann's abduction from Argentina to stand trial in Israel, 
the jurisdiction of Israeli courts, and the retroactivity of Israeli 
law.119 The District Court of Jerusalem resolved each of these is-
sues based upon international and Israeli law and in light of public 
policy.120 
The District Court refused to find the Mossad's abduction of 
Eichmann illegal. 121 Instead, the Court relied on a general rule of 
international law which prohibits a criminal to use the method by 
which the forum has obtained him as a defense to his being tried 
in that state. 122 The District Court went on to validate jurisdiction 
over Eichmann, once he was present in Israel. 
Counsel for Eichmann objected to the jurisdiction of the Is-
raeli court and its application of Israeli law on grounds of interna-
tional law. Eichmann contended that his prosecution, after being 
kidnapped from Argentina and brought to stand trial in Israel, vio-
lated international law and exceeded the jurisdiction of the Israeli 
court.123 The District Court, however, rejected Eichmann's conten-
tion and held that jurisdiction to try the case was based on the 
Nazi Punishment Law,124 "a statutory law the provisions of which 
235-53 (District Court Judgment)). 
114. H. ARENDT, EICHMANN IN JERUSALEM 240 (1963). 
115. Moeller, supra note 29, at 856 n.402 and accompanying text. 
116. Id. at n.403 and accompanying text. Jurisdiction over Eichmann's crimes could not 
be based upon the protective principle of jurisdiction, because Israel was not a nation at the 
time of Eichmann's crimes. Jurisdiction could not be based upon the passive personality, 
because none of the victims were Israeli nationals at the time of the crimes. Id. at n.405 and 
accompanying text. 
117. Id. at n.404 and accompanying text. 
118. See P.PAPADATOS, THE EICHMANN TRIAL (1964). 
119. Id. at 48-101. 
120. See Oliver, Judicial Decisions, 56 A.J.l.L. 805 (1962). 
121. Id. at 835. 
122. Id. 
123. Oliver, supra note 120, at 805. 
124. Nazi Punishment Law, Law of Aug. 1, 5710-1050 (1950] 4 Laws of the State of 
Israel No. 64 cited in Oliver, supra note 120, at 807. 
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are unequivocal. "126 The District Court found no violation of inter-
national law in giving effect to the law of the Knesset.126 
The District Court also rejected Eichmann's argument con-
cerning the retroactivity of Israeli law. The Nazi Punishment Law, 
which was enacted in 1950 to punish those who had committed 
Nazi war crimes, covered a specified period which had ended five 
years prior to the enactment of the law.127 The District Court com-
pared the retroactive application of the Nazi Punishment Law to 
the laws used to prosecute Nazi war criminals at Nuremberg: a 
compilation of universal principles of justice.128 Similarly, the Dis-
trict Court upheld the Nazi Punishment Law on grounds of univer-
sal jurisdiction, because "no principle of international law could 
have denied the new State [Israel] the natural power to put on 
trial all those killers of [her] people who fell into [her] hands. "129 
The Federal Republic of Germany protested against Eich-
mann's trial, 130 based upon what it saw as the danger inherent in 
claims of univeral jurisdiction.131 Most other countries found no 
problem with Israel's punishing "one of history's greatest persecu-
tors of the laws. "132 
Another example of Israel's use of the Nazi Punishment Laws, 
as applied through the universality principle, is the trial of I van 
Demjanjuk.133 In 1983, Israel requested that the United States ex-
tradite Demjanjuk134 to Israel to stand trial for the atrocities he 
committed while a guard at Treblinka.136 According to the U.S.-
125. Oliver, supra note 120, at 807. 
126. Id. 
127. Id. at 832. 
128. Id. "Many of the national courts now functioning in the liberated countries have 
been established recently, but no one has argued that they are not competent to try the 
cases that arose before their establishment .... No defendant can complain that he is be-
ing tried by a Court which did not exist when he committed the act." Id. (quoting Goodhart 
in The Legality of the Nuremberg Trial, JuRID. REV. 8, (April 1946)). 
129. Oliver, supra note 120, at 834. 
130. Goldie, supra note 48, at 18. 
131. Id. 
132. Goldie, supra note 48, at 18. 
133. See A. RYAN, supra note 1, at 94-141. 
134. Id. at 102. In 1958, Demjanjuk and his wife became American citizens. Id. 
135. United States v. Demjanjuk, 518 F. Supp. 1362 (1981), aff'd, 680 F.2d 32 (6th Cir. 
1982), cert. denied, 459 U.S. 1036 (1982). 
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Israeli extradition treaty,136 the United States agreed137 and Israel 
began a criminal trial for Demjanjuk's prosecution.138 
The examples of Eichmann and Demjanjuk are the most 
prominent cases in which Israel has taken an active role in prose-
cuting individuals who have harmed and tortured her nationals. 
Recognition of universal jurisdiction ensures Israel's rights to pun-
ish heinous crimes committed against her citizens.139 The effects of 
Nazi war crimes, however, are not unique to Israel. These abhor-
rent crimes afflicted mankind as a whole and, as violations of the 
law of nations, uo every nation has a legal obligation to punish the 
perpetrators.141 
C. Canada 
Canada is yet another country that has acknowledged its obli-
gation to prosecute Nazi war criminals. In September of 1987, Can-
ada enacted a statute which confers jurisdiction upon its courts to 
prosecute every person who commits an act or omission outside of 
Canada that constitutes a war crime or a crime against human-
ity.142 The statute covers acts or omissions committed at a time in 
which "Canada could, in conformity with international law, exer-
cise jurisdiction over the person with respect to the act or omission 
on the basis of the person's presence in Canada, [or] subsequent to 
the time of the act or omission the person is present in Canada. "us 
Thus, the statute bases jurisdiction upon the universality principle. 
Like the universality principle, if someone has committed a 
136. Israel requested Demjanjuk's extradition pursuant to the Convention on Extradi-
tion between the Government of the United States and the Government of the State of 
Israel, 14 U.S.T. 1707, T.I.A.S. 5476 (entered into force Dec. 5, 1963). 
137. United States v. Demjanjuk, 518 F. Supp. 1362 (1981), aff'd, 680 F.2d 32 (6th Cir. 
1982). 
138. N.Y. Times, Apr. 19, 1988, at 1, col. 1. An Israeli court convicted Demjanjuk of 
committing war crimes. An appeal of this judgment is currently pending. 
139. The victims were not Israeli citizens at the time of the war crimes, because Israel 
did not become a state until 1948. The State of Israel's "right to punish" Nazi war 
criminals, however, is derived from: 
[A] universal source (pertaining to the whole of mankind) which vests the right to 
prosecute and punish crimes of this order in every State within the family of na-
tions; and a specific or national source which gives the victim nation the right to try 
any who assault their existence. 
Oliver, supra note 120, at 828. 
140. Id. at 808. 
141. See id. at 811. 
142. An Act to amend the Criminal Code, the Immigration Act, 1976 and the Citizen-
ship Act, 35-36 Eliz., ch.37, §1.91 (1987). 
143. Id. 
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criminal act and that person is present in Canada, then such pres-
ence triggers jurisdiction in Canada so to allow prosecution of the 
offender.144 Moreover, the Canadian statute does not create retro-
actively any new crimes. Unless the offense was one under interna-
tional or Canadian law when committed, it is not considered crimi-
nal at the time of prosecution.146 Such requirements comply with 
those under international and Canadian laws. 
The purpose of the Canadian statute is to prevent Canada 
from becoming "a haven for those persons who have committed 
acts. . . which are rightly condemned throughout the civilized 
world."146 One parlemantarian commented that "[i]t is difficult to 
characterize Canada as a just society or civilized place without a 
strong policy to bring to justice those who have committed crimes 
which can be characterized as war crimes or crimes against human-
ity.147 In passing this legislation, the Canadians sent a strong mes-
sage about its civilization. The message conveyed suggests that this 
type of conduct will not go unpunished.148 
Under international law, every nation has jurisdiction to pros-
ecute war criminals in its custody regardless of the victim's nation-
ality or of the place where the crime was committed.149 Accord-
ingly, the United States is obligated to recognize universal 
jurisdiction and to prosecute Nazi war criminals, especially where, 
for some reason, the crime would otherwise go unpunished. 
D. The United States 
After World War II, the United States became the home to 
refugees, many of whom were imprisoned, tortured or otherwise 
abused by Nazi war criminals. Through U.S. immigration law, 
those refugees became citizens and nationals of the United 
States.uo 
144. An Act to amend the Criminal Code, the Immigration Act, 1976 and the Citizen-
ship Act, H.C. 33d Parl., 2d Sess. 1:35 (1987). 
145. Id. at 1:14. Prior to enacting the law, the House of Commons worried that the 
statute would not be in conformity with international law or Canadian law. Id. 
146. 129 PARL. DEB., H.C. (2d Sess.) 159 (1987). 
147. Id. 
148. Id. Mr. Nelson Riis commented, "Clearly after 42 years of inaction we owe it not 
only to the memories of those who have died but also to their families who have suffered in 
surviving. Id. 
149. Cowles, Universality of Jurisdiction Over War Crimes, 33 CALIF. L. REV. 177, 218 
(1945). The author states the jurisdictional principle of universality is applicable to the pun-
ishment of war crimes. Id. 
150. See The Immigration and Nationality Act of June 27, 1952, Pub. L. No. 82-414, 66 
17
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Nazi war criminals also fled Europe for the United States after 
World War II · in order to escape prosecution and to facilitate 
changing their identities to survive unnoticed.m Many Nazi war 
criminals found it easy to enter the United States, 162 because of 
the flood of immigration into the country, especially with the en-
actment of the Displaced Persons Act. 163 
With the large number of Nazi war criminals in the United 
States since World War II, the United States, like Canada, could 
establish jurisdiction over these criminals under the universality 
principle.164 The United States, however, has avoided exercising ju-
risdiction over Nazi war criminals166 by using alternative means to 
trying and sentencing the criminals in the United States.166 
1. Denaturalization, Deportation and Extradition as Alterna-
tives to Prosecution of Nazi War Criminals 
Almost all legal actions brought against Nazi war criminals in 
the United States are denaturalization proceedings.167 Denaturali-
zation deprives the individual of citizenship and subjects him to 
deportation.168 Congress in 1978 amended the Immigration and 
Nationality Act169 to include Nazi war criminals as a class of ex-
cludable and deportable aliens. 160 
Stat. 163 (codified at 8 U.S.C. §§1101-1525 (1983)). 
151. A. RYAN, supra note 1, at 276. 
152. Allan Ryan, Jr., investigator for the Justice Department's Office of Special Investi-
gation commented: "How did Nazi war criminals come to the United States? We invited 
them in." Id. at 28. 
153. Displaced Persons Act of 1948, Pub. L. No. 80-774, 62 Stat. 1009, amended at Pub. 
L. No. 81-555, 64 Stat 219 (expired 1952). A total of 400,000 people entered the United 
States under the Displaced Persons Act before its expiration. A. RYAN, supra note 1, at 25. 
Approximately 10,000 alleged Nazi war criminals entered the United States under this Act. 
Id. 
154. See supra notes 142-149. 
155. See, e.g., Blayney, Herbert Pell: War Crimes and the Jews, 65 AMER. JEWISH HIST. 
Q. 335-352 (1976). 
156. See infra notes 157-177 and accompanying text. 
157. See The Immigration and Nationality Act of June 27, 1952, Pub. L. No. 82-414, 66 
Stat. 163 (codified at 8 U.S.C. § 1451(a)). 
158. Id. 
159. The Immigration and Nationality Act of Oct. 30, 1978, Pub. L. No. 95-549, 92 Stat. 
2065 (codified at 8 U.S.C. §1182(a)(33) (1978)). 
160. Id. The 1978 amendment subjects to deportation: 
Any alien who during the period beginning on March 23, 1933, and ending on May 
8, 1945, under the direction of, or in association with-
(A) the Nazi government in Germany, 
(B) any government in any area occupied by the military forces of the Nazi govern-
ment of Germany, 
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Under the amendment, a U.S. district attorney must prove by 
clear and convincing evidence161 that the alien fits into one of the 
enumerated classes before an immigration judge can find him de-
portable.162 The alien, however, can appeal an adverse decision to 
the Board of Immigration Appeals163 as well as to the federal 
courts for further review. 16" 
Once the court finally determines that the alien is deportable, 
the alien may choose the country to which he is sent.165 If the alien 
makes no choice, he may be deported to the country of his birth, to 
the country from which he came or to any country that will take 
him. 166 Deportation is complicated, because few countries want to 
take in Nazi war criminals.167 As such, the United States gladly 
grants requests for extradition in order to get rid of Nazi war 
criminals. 168 
Extradition is a bilateral process. The United States requires a 
formal request for the return of a criminal by a nation with whom 
the United States has a valid treaty.169 For example, the United 
States granted the extradition of Ivan Demjanjuk upon Israel's re-
quest pursuant to the Convention on Extradition Between the 
Government of the United States and the Government of the State 
of Israel. 170 
(C) any government established with the assistance or cooperation of the Nazi gov-
ernment of Germany, or 
(D) any government which was an ally of the Nazi government of Germany, 
ordered, incited assisted, or otherwise participated in the persecution of any person 
because of race, religion, national origin, or political opinion. 
Immigration and Nationality Act of Oct. 30, 1978, Pub. L. No. 95-549, 92 Stat. 2065 (codi-
fied at 8 U.S.C. §1182(a)(33) (1978). 
161. See Chaunt v. United States, 364 U.S. 350 (1960). 
162. See 8 U.S.C. §1252(b) (1983). 
163. See INS Appeals, 8 C.F.R. §242.21 (1984). 
164. See 8 U.S.C. §1105a (1961). For an in depth discussion of the controlling law on 
Nazi war criminals subject to denaturalization and deportation by the United States, see 
Note, Nazi War Criminals in the United States: It's Never Too Late For Justice, 19 VAND. 
J . TRANS. L. 856 (1986). 
165. The Immigration and Nationality Act of June 27, 1952, Pub. L. No. 82-414, 66 
Stat. 163 (codified at 8 U.S.C. §1253(a)). 
166. The Immigration and Nationality Act of June 27, 1952, Pub. L. No. 82-414, 66 
Stat. 163 (codified at 8 U.S.C. §1253(a)). 
167. Note, Nazi War Criminals in the United States, supra note 164, at 884 (1986). 
168. See supra notes 134-138 and accompanying text. 
169. See 18 U.S.C. §§3181-3195 (1982). For further discussion of the extradition of Nazi 
war criminals, see Note, Nazi War Criminals in the United States, supra note 164, at 885-
892. 
170. The Convention on Extradition Between the Government of the United States and 
the Government of the State of Israel, Dec. 10, 1962, 14 U.S.T. 1707, T.l.A.S. 5476 (entered 
into force Dec. 5, 1963). 
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Although denaturalization and deportation represent the ex-
tent of prosecution of Nazi war criminals under current U.S. immi-
gration171 and criminal172 laws, these two processes serve only to 
remove the criminals from the United States, but do not ensure 
proper punishment. Extradition is the other, yet less frequently 
available, alternative.173 All three processes are tedious, m often 
unreliablem and exemplify the fact that immigration law should 
not be used as a substitute for the criminal justice system.176 Ac-
cordingly, the United States must extend the trend of asserting ju-
risdiction over other crimes committed abroad 177 to Nazi war 
crimes. 
IV. THE GROWTH OF EXTRATERRITORIAL JURISDICTION OVER 
TERRORISTS EXTENDED TO CONFER U.S. JURISDICTION OVER NAZI 
WAR CRIMINALS 
A. Growth of Jurisdiction Over Terrorists 
The escalation of international terrorism during the past few 
years has led the United States to actively pursue extraterritorial 
jurisdiction in order to protect its citizens from acts of terrorism 
committed abroad.178 The Omnibus Diplomatic Security and Anti-
terrorism Act of 1986 ("Anti-terrorism Act") expands U.S. jurisdic-
tion over foreign nationals committing acts of international terror-
ism against U.S. citizens.179 The Anti-terrorism Act bases jurisdic-
171. See Note, Nazi War Criminals in the United States, supra note 164, at 884. 
172. Murdering civilians in Nazi concentration camps during World War II is not a 
prosecutable offense under present U.S. criminal law. See United States v. Demjanjuk, 518 
F. Supp. 1362 (N.D. Ohio 1981), aff'd, 680 F.2d 32 (6th Cir. 1982), cert. denied, 459 U.S. 
1036 (1982). 
173. See supra notes 168-170 and accompanying text. 
17 4. For a detailed look at the tedious processes of denaturalization, deportation and 
extradition, see Note, Nazi War Criminals in the United States, supra note 164, at 872-
892. 
175. The denaturalization, deportation and extradition processes are unreliable, be-
cause they do not ensure that the Nazi war criminal will be prosecuted for his crimes. They 
simply serve to rid the United States of the problem. 
176. Note, Nazi War Criminals in the United States, supra note 164, at 885. 
177. See infra notes 178-199 and accompanying text. 
178. See N.Y. Times, Jan.19, 1986, at 1, col. 4 (discusses rise in terrorism in 1985 and 
recent proposals to prevent terrorist attacks). 
179. Omnibus Diplomatic Security and Anti-terrorism Act 1986, Pub. L. No. 99-399, 
§1202, 1986 U.S. CooE CONG. & ADMIN. NEWS (100 Stat.) 853, 895-97 (codified at 18 U.S.C. 
§2331) [Anti-terrorism Act]. Id. Section 1202 of the Act provides, in part: 
(a) HOMICIDE. - Whoever kills a national of the United States, while such na-
tional is outside the United States, shall - ... be fined under this title or impris-
oned for any term of years for life ... Id. at §2331(a). 
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tion on the universality and passive personality principles, a 
significant departure from the traditional concepts of territoriality 
and nationality.180 
A prerequisite of exercising universal jurisdiction is that the 
crime committed is so heinous and of such universal magnitude 
that any nation obtaining personal jurisdiction over the accused 
may prosecute.181 Congress recognized that the Anti-terrorism Act 
should be based upon the universality principle, because universal-
ity would justify expansion of extraterritorial jurisdiction by im-
plying that international terrorism should be treated as a crime of 
universal magnitude.182 The Anti-terrorism Act, however, is not 
based upon the universality principle, because terrorism has "not 
yet achieved sufficient intensity of interest to warrant recognition 
as a true basis for universal jurisdiction. "183 
Unlike terrorism, the crimes of piracy,184 slave trading,1H hi-
jacking or attacks on civil aircraft,186 genocide,187 and war crimes188 
(emphasis added). 
180. The territorial principle is inapplicable, because the Anti-terrorism Act applies to 
crimes committed outside the United States. The nationality principle is inapplicable, be-
cause the Anti-terrorism Act applies to all persons who commit terrorist acts, not just U.S. 
nationals. See Pub. L. No. 99-399, §1202 (1986) U.S. CODE CONG. & ADMIN. NEWS (100 Stat.) 
853 (codified at 18 U.S.C. §2331). 
181. See Draft Convention, supra note 14. 
182. See HR. CoNF. REP. No. 783, 99th Cong., 2d Sess. 86 (1986), reprinted in 1986 U.S. 
CODE CONG. & ADMIN. NEWS 1926, 1959. 
183. Blakesley, supra note 68, at 719. 
184. Id. at 717-718. Piracy is a crime punishable by any nation that obtains or captures 
the pirate. See The Geneva Convention on the High Seas, Apr. 29, 1958, 13 U.S.T. 2312, 
T.l.A.S. No. 5200, 450 U.N.T.S. 82, art. 19 (entered into force Sept. 30, 1962). 
185. Id. at arts. 13, 22. 
186. See, e.g., Montreal Convention (convention for the suppression of unlawful acts 
against the safety of civil aviation), Sept. 23, 1971, 24 U.S.T. 565, T.l.A.S. No. 7570, 974 
U.N.T.S. 177 (entered into force in U.S., Jan. 26, 1973). See also Hague Convention (con-
vention for suppression of unlawful seizure of aircraft) Dec. 16, 1970, 22 U.S.T. 1641, 
T.l.A.S. No. 7192, 860 U.N.T.S. 105 (entered into force in U.S., Oct. 14, 1971). 
187. Genocide has been recognized as a universal crime, punishable by any state signa-
tory to The Convention on the Prevention and Punishment of the Crime of Genocide [here-
inafter Genocide Convention], Dec. 9, 1948, 78 U.N.T.S. 277. The United States ratified the 
Genocide Convention in October 1988. See Genocide Convention Implementation Act of 
1987 (The Proxmire Act), Pub. L. No. 100-606, 1988 U.S. CODE CONG. & ADMIN. NEWS (101 
Stat.) 4156-4166 (codified at 18 U.S.C. §§ 1091-1093 (1988)) [hereinafter Proxmire Act]. The 
Act makes genocide a "basic offense" punishable by (1) a fine of not more than $1,000,000 
and imprisonment for life, and (2) a fine of not more than $1,000,000 or imprisonment for 
not more than twenty years, or both, depending upon the offense. Proxmire Act, 18 U.S.C. § 
1091(a)-(b). Subsection 1091(d) sets forth that the circumstances required for the U.S. 
courts to exercise jurisdiction over the conduct proscribed by a basic offense. Such circum-
stances are where the offense is committed within the United States, or where the alleged 
offender is a national of the United States. Proxmire Act, 18 U.S.C. § 1091(d)(l)-(2). Thus, 
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have been acknowledged as of such universal interest and intensity 
that "international conventions have been aimed at their elimina-
tion. "189 There is a trend to recognize terrorism as a crime of uni-
versal magnitude, but the international community has not yet 
found the crime serious enough to justify the exercise of universal 
jurisdiction.190 As such, the Anti-terrorism Act alternatively bases 
jurisdiction on the passive personality principle.191 
The Anti-terrorism Act proscribes terrorism committed 
abroad by foreign nationals against U.S. citizens. 192 Although U.S. 
courts traditionally rejected the use of passive personality jurisdic-
tion, 193 more recent decisions have acknowledged this principle as 
a valid basis for exercising jurisdiction. 194 These cases support the 
proposition that, even without explicit congressional authority, 
courts can apply the passive personality principle to exercise extra-
territorial jurisdiction.196 The growth of U.S. jurisdiction over ex-
traterritorial crimes under the passive personality principle led to 
the Anti-terrorism Act's enactment.196 
The Anti-terrorism Act precedent is narrowly tailored to pro-
scribe terrorism 197 and has not been applied to other criminal acts 
the Nazi war criminals who, as displaced persons, became nationalized U.S. citizens after 
World War II are subject to criminal liability under U.S. law. 
188. See generally, In re Yamashita, 327 U.S. 1 (1945)(War crimes are punishable in 
the United States). 
189. Blakesley, supra note 68, at 717-18. 
190. Donnelly, Extraterritorial Jurisdiction Over Acts of Terrorism Committed 
Abroad: Omnibus Diplomatic Security and Antiterrorism Act of 1986, 72 CORNELL L. REV. 
599, 602 (1987) (for a discussion of the impact of terrorism on the international community). 
191. Omnibus Diplomatic Security and Anti-terrorism Act, Pub. L. No. 99-399, § 1202, 
codified as amended at 18 U.S.C. § 2331, reprinted in 1986 U.S. CODE CONG. & ADMIN. NEWS 
(100 Stat.) 853, 896-897 (codified at 18 U.S.C. §2331). 
192. Id. 
193. See supra notes 41-73 and accompanying text. 
194. See United States v. Layton, 509 F. Supp. 212 (N.D. Cal. 1981), appeal dismissed, 
645 F.2d 681 (9th Cir. 1981), cert. denied, 452 U.S. 973 (1981). 
195. For cases that assert that United States can exercise jurisdiction under any of the 
principles of jurisdiction, including the passive personality, see United States v. Smith, 680 
F.2d 255, 257 (1st Cir. 1982), cert. denied, 459 U.S. 1110 (1983); see United States v. Rodri-
guez, 182 F. Supp. 479 (S.D. Cal. 1960), aff'd in part sub nom. Rocha v. United States, 288 
F.2d 545 (9th Cir. 1961), cert. denied, 366 U.S. 948 (1961); but see United States v. Co-
lumba-Colella, 604 F.2d 356 (5th Cir. 1979). 
196. For a detailed look at the growth of extraterritorial jurisdiction based on the pas-
sive personality, see Donnelly, supra note 190, at 616-619. 
197. To date, there exists no consensus among nations as to the definition of "interna-
tional terrorism." See Convention to Prevent and Punish the Acts of Terrorism Taking the 
Form Of Crimes Against Persons and Related Extortion That Are Of International Signifi-
cance, Feb. 2, 1971, 27 U.S.T. 3949, T.l.A.S No. 8413 (entered into force in the United 
States October 20, 1976). 
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committed abroad. 198 This statute, however, is proof that 
". . . [ t] he expansion of extraterritorial jurisdiction is justifiable 
within the framework of existing United States and international 
law."199 There is no reason why this precedent cannot be applied to 
base U.S. jurisdiction over Nazi war criminals. 
B. Expanded Jurisdictional Principles Vis-a- Vis Terrorists 
Extended to Nazi War Criminals 
The United States has come a long way toward expanding ju-
risdiction since the days of American Banana, 200 especially with 
the enactment of the Anti-terrorism Act.201 No longer are the prin-
ciples of territoriality and nationality the limits of jurisdictional 
reach by the U.S. courts. 202 Courts will actively assert any of the 
five principles of jurisdiction in order to bring terrorists to jus-
tice. 203 This growth of extraterritorial jurisdiction must similarly 
be extended to confer jurisdiction over Nazi war criminals. 
The United States does not assert jurisdiction over Nazi war 
criminals because the crimes did not occur within U.S. territory, 
yet ironically it will prosecute terrorists who commit extraterrito-
rial crimes. 20• The different characteristics of terrorists and Nazi 
war criminals should not account for the different treatment by 
the United States. 
Many terrorists are foreign nationals who have committed acts 
of terrorism abroad against U.S. citizens. All Nazi war criminals, 
on the other hand, were foreign nationals who committed war 
crimes abroad against non-U.S. citizens. The basic difference is, 
therefore, the victim. With terrorists, the victim was, at the time of 
the crime, a U.S. citizen. The U.S. government is quick to assert 
jurisdiction over acts of violence against its citizens, because the 
198. The Act's legislative history demonstrates that Congress intended the certification 
of the Attorney General for the prosecution of a terrorist to ensure that the Act is not 
applied to normal street crimes. H.R. CoNF. REP. No. 783, 99th Cong., 2d Sess. 86, 87-88 
(1986), reprinted in 1986 U.S. CODE CONG. & ADMIN. NEWS at 1960-1961. 
199. Donnelly, supra note 190, at 611. 
200. See supra notes 44-47 and accompanying text. 
201. Omnibus Diplomatic Security and Anti-terrorism Act, Pub. L. No. 99-399, §1202, 
codified as amended at 18 U.S.C. §2331, reprinted in 1986 U.S. CODE CONG. & ADMIN. NEWS 
(100 Stat.) 853, 896-97. 
202. See supra notes 178-199 and accompanying text. 
203. See supra notes 14-40 and accompanying text. 
204. See Omnibus Diplomatic Security and Anti-terrorism Act, Pub. L. No. 99-399, 
§1202, codified as amended at 18 U.S.C. §2331, reprinted in 1986 U.S. CODE CONG. & ADMIN. 
NEWS (100 Stat.) 853. 
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government has a primary interest in the welfare of its citizens. 
With Nazi war criminals, the victim was, at the time of the crime, 
a non-U.S. citizen.20~ The U.S. government, therefore, has a sec-
ondary interest206 in the victim's welfare. Accordingly, the United 
States leaves punishment to states with primary responsibility. 
Unfortunately, the states whose nationals were persecuted have 
not consistently asserted jurisdiction over the prosecution of Nazi 
war criminals. 207 
Terrorists and Nazi war criminals should not be treated differ-
ently due to the status of their victims, because none of the five 
principles of jurisdiction208 are based solely on the victim's nation-
ality. In actuality, terrorists and Nazi war criminals are similar. 
Both are foreign nationals who have committed violent acts 
outside U.S. territory and and therefore they must be treated the 
same. 
The most common characteristic of terrorists and Nazi war 
criminals is the violent extraterritorial crimes they have commit-
ted. For example, terrorists commit acts of terrorism. Although 
there has been difficulty in actually defining terrorism,209 the For-
eign Intelligence Surveillance Act defines international terrorism 
as ". . . violent acts or acts dangerous to human life that are a 
violation of the criminal laws of the United States or of any State, 
or that would be a criminal violation if committed within the juris-
diction of the United States or any State."210 Moreover, the only 
limit the Anti-terrorism Act211 puts on the definition of terrorism 
is that it does not include normal street crimes or barroom 
brawls. 212 Either definition of terrorism is, therefore, broad enough 
to encompass Nazi war crimes. 
205. All of the victims of the Holocaust were East and West Europeans. 
206. The primary interest is of the states whose nationals, at the time of the crimes, 
were persecuted. 
207. See Moeller, supra note 29, at 839. See, e.g., In re Valerian Trifa, No. a 7-819-396 
(Imm. Ct., Detroit, Mich., Oct. 4, 1982), in which the United States obtained a deportation 
order for Trifa. Nevertheless, the United States tried for over one year to find a state willing 
to accept him, because Rumania, the country of his birth, refused. 
208. See supra notes 14-40 and accompanying text. 
209. See supra note 197. 
210. Foreign Intelligence Surveillance Act of 1978, Pub. L. No. 95-511, 92 Stat. 1783, 50 
u.s.c. §1801 (1983). 
211. Omnibus Diplomatic Security and Anti-terrorism Act, Pub. L. No. 99-399, § 1202, 
codified as amended at 18 U.S.C. §2331, reprinted in 1986 U.S. CODE CONG. & ADMIN. NEWS 
(100 Stat.) 853, 896-97. 
212. H.R. CoNF. REP. No. 783, 99th Cong., 2d Sess. 86, 87-88, reprinted in 1986 U.S. 
CoDE CoNG. & ADMIN. NEWS at 1960 (1986). 
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Nazi war crimes were not ordinary crimes. Nazi war crimes 
were violent acts dangerous to human life. They were acts in viola-
tion of the criminal laws of the United States213 and of other 
states.214 It is arguable that the definition of war crimes216 encom-
passes terrorism. The U.S. government, however, would argue that 
the distinction between crime and terrorism is that the former is 
motivated by self-interest and the latter seeks to effect political 
change. 216 This distinction is not dispositive, because terrorism is a 
crime which can both stem from self-interest and seek to result in 
political change. Thus, this distinction by definition must not be 
used by the United States as an excuse from prosecuting Nazi war 
criminals. 
While there are differences between Nazi war criminals and 
terrorists, the similarities217 are compelling. Moreover, there is 
room within the broad definition of terrorism proscribed by the 
Anti-terrorism Act218 to include Nazi war crimes as extraterritorial 
offenses punishable by the United States. The U.S. Congress can 
thereby pattern new legislation after the Anti-terrorism Act, ex-
plicitly conferring jurisdiction on the federal courts over Nazi war 
criminals. 
Even if Congress refuses to extend the universality principle 
as ultra vires U.S. law, this principle is still applicable, because 
crimes against humanity are similar to the old crimes of piracy and 
he who commits such crimes becomes like the pirate in interna-
tional law.219 Piracy is the exception to the territorial principle220 
which, in the absence of an international penal code, would remain 
the primary legal principle for responsibility in trying Nazi war 
criminals. This principle would confer U.S. jurisdiction to prose-
cute and punish Nazi war criminals, although the crime was com-
mitted outside U.S. territory. The prosecution of Nazi war 
criminals demands immediate attention and the United States 
must assert jurisdiction over them if its resolve to preserve justice 
is genuine. 
213. See generally , In re Yamashita, 327 U.S. 1 (1945). 
214. See generally , Genocide Convention, Dec. 9, 1948, 78 U.N.T.S. 277. 
215. See supra note 16 for the definition of "war crimes." 
216. See Donnelly, supra note 190, at 613. 
217. See supra notes 205-216 and accompanying text. 
218. See supra note 179 for the broad definition of terrorism punishable by the Anti-
terrorism Act. 
219. See generally, Geneva Convention on the High Seas, Apr. 28, 1958, 13 U.S.T. 2312, 
T .l.A.S. No. 5200, 450 U.N.T.S. See also H. ARENDT, EICHMANN IN JERUSALEM 240 (1963). 
220. See Draft Convention, supra note 14, at 563. 
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C. U.S. Legal and Moral Obligations for Prosecuting Nazi War 
Criminals 
Legally, the United States has a duty under international law 
to punish Nazi war criminals. As a signatory to the London Agree-
ment221 and a member of the International Military Tribunal 
("Tribunal"),222 the United States is obligated to assist in trying 
and punishing the major war criminals of the European Axis. 223 
Under the London Agreement, the United States was required ei-
ther to extradite the Nazi war criminal to stand trial in the state 
recognizing jurisdiction or to deliver the criminal to the Tribunal 
at Nuremberg.224 Although the Tribunal is now defunct,226 the U.S. 
government still views the London Agreement as a binding inter-
national instrument. 226 
In the absence of the Tribunal - as a supranational court in 
which to prosecute Nazi war criminals - the alternative available to 
the United States under the London Agreement is extradition. In 
the absence of a state requesting the criminal's extradition, the 
U.S. duty, under customary international law - pursuant to the 
maxim aut dedere aut judicare - is to place the criminal on trial 
under its own law.227 Thus, the United States is legally obligated to 
prosecute Nazi war criminals where the alternative is setting the 
criminal free. 
The United States is also morally obligated to punish Nazi 
war criminals. Nazi war crimes are not unique to any country, but 
are, in fact, violations of the laws of nations.228 "It is therefore the 
moral duty of every sovereign state to. . .enforce the natural right 
to punish, possessed by the victims of the crime whoever they may 
221. See Agreement for the Prosecution and Punishment of the Major War Criminals 
of the European Axis, Aug. 8, 1945, 59 Stat. 1544, E.A.S. No. 472, 82 U.N.T.S. 279 [hereinaf-
ter London Agreement]. The London Agreement was signed by the United States, France, 
Great Britain, and the Soviet Union as a formal pledge" ... to deliver Nazi war criminals to 
a swift and sobering justice." Note, supra note 164, at 858. 
222. See Charter of the International Military Tribunal, London Agreement, art. 6, 59 
Stat. 1547, E.A.S. No. 472, 82 U.N.T.S. 279, 286. 
223. See Moeller, supra note 29, at 799. 
224. Id. at 802; see also London Agreement, 59 Stat. 1544, E.A.S. No. 472, 82 U.N.T.S. 
279. 
225. See Moeller, supra note 29, at 799. The Tribunal disbanded on Oct. 1, 1946. See 
Note, supra note 157, at 858. 
226. See Moeller, supra note 29, at 802; see also London Agreement, 59 Stat. 1547, 
E.A.S. No. 472, 82 U.N.T.S. 279. 
227. See Moeller, supra note 29, at 803. See also M. Bassiouni, International Extradi-
tion, U.S. L. AND PRAC. ch. 2, §2 (1983). 
228. Oliver, supra note 120, at 812. 
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be, against criminals whose acts have 'violated in extreme form the 
law of nature or the law of nations.' "229 Thus, the United States 
must enforce its citizens230 rights to bring the criminals to sobering 
justice. The moral obligation of the United States also has roots in 
the Genocide Convention. 
The Genocide Convention231 affirmed that genocide232 is a 
crime under international law, and invited the signatories to enact 
the necessary legislation for prevention and punishment of the 
crime. 233 The Genocide Convention codifies a moral re-awakening 
of an acknowledgment that every state is obligated under interna-
tional law to use all necessary measures to bring the Nazi criminals 
responsible for World War II atrocities to justice. 234 
The member states of the Genocide Convention, therefore, 
made a moral commitment by signing the Convention. The United 
States ratified the Convention in 1988.2H The U.S. moral obliga-
tion to preventing and punishing such a heinous and universal 
crime certainly is sincere. 
V. CONCLUSION 
The United States does not recognize the universality princi-
ple that would confer jurisdiction over Nazi war criminals. Current 
U.S. immigration law limits its bases of jurisdiction over foreign 
nationals committing extraterritorial crimes.236 Without the United 
States' active and effective participation in the search for and 
prosecution of Nazi war criminals, most of those crimes will con-
tinue to go unpunished. 
229. Id. at 810 (emphasis added). 
230. See supra notes 150-156 and accompanying text for a discussion of the victims of 
Nazi war crimes and the perpetrators who emigrated to the United States following World 
War II and are now naturalized citizens. 
231. Oliver, supra note 120, at 810. The United Nations General Assembly affirmed, 
invited, and recommended these goals in its resolution to prevent and punish the crime of 
genocide. See id. at 813. See also Genocide Convention, Dec. 9, 1948, 78 U.N.T.S. 277. 
232. Genocide is: 
. . . a denial of the right of existence of entire human groups, a denial which shocks 
the conscience of mankind and results in great losses to humanity, and which is 
contrary to moral law . . . 
Oliver, supra note 120, at 813 (citing Resolution 96(1) of the General Assembly, Dec. 11, 
1946). 
233. See Oliver, supra note 120, at 815. 
234. Moeller, supra note 29, at 797. 
235. See supra note 187. 
236. See supra note 150 and accompanying text. The Immigration and Nationality Act 
limits United States legal action over Nazi war criminals to denaturalization, deportation 
and extradition. See id. 
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The United States must pass legislation that affirmatively as-
serts jurisdiction over Nazi war criminals. For example, the Israeli 
statute asserting Israeli jurisdiction over crimes committed extra-
territorially and by aliens against Israeli citizens, 237 is used by 
Israel to confer jurisdiction over Nazi war criminals. And Canada -
a country in many ways similar to the United States - recently has 
enacted a law allowing its courts to prosecute Nazi war criminals. 
Yet another example of an active commitment to redress harm to a 
nation's citizens is the Anti-terrorism Act, discussed above.238 
Likewise, Congress must not "close the chapter" on Nazi war 
crimes and allow the persecutors of the laws to go free. 239 
The United States must prosecute and punish Nazi war 
crimi:::ials. There are legal bases for U.S. jurisdiction. 240 There are 
also moral bases for jurisdiction.241 Perhaps the U.S. government 
has inhibitions, because it is a relatively political area of the law. 
Protecting and preserving its citizens' faith in jurisprudence, how-
ever, must be a prime incentive to enact legislation to prosecute 
and punish the Nazi terrorists who have permanently affected the 
lives of many U.S. citizens.242 
Debbie Morowitz 
237. See supra note 108 and accompanying text for a discussion of the Nazi Punish-
ment Laws. 
238. Omnibus Diplomatic Security and Anti-terrorism Act of 1986, Pub. L. No. 99-399, 
§1202, codified as amended at 18 U.S.C. §2331, reprinted in 1986 U.S. CODE CONG. & ADMIN. 
NEWS (100 Stat.) 853. 
239. N.Y. Times, Feb. 4, 1988, at A5, col. 1. For example, Australia, a nation possessing 
neither territorial nor national jurisdiction, is in the midst of amending its criminal code to 
include Nazi war crimes (committed abroad) as an offense punishable under Australian law. 
Id. 
240. See supra notes 150-156 and accompanying text. 
241. See A. RYAN, supra note 1, at 344 and accompanying text. The moral bases for 
jurisdiction include the U.S. belief "in the injustice of persecution and the integrity of the 
law." Id. 
242. See generally Crawford, The Holocaust: A Never Ending Agony, in THE ANNALS 
OF THE AMERICAN ACADEMY OF POLITICAL AND SOCIAL SCIENCE 250-255 (July 1980). Craw-
ford's study verifies the permanent impact on the victims of the Holocaust. 
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